For a year the region’s leaders courted Islamabad. Since December 2025 the presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan all traveled to Pakistan, laying groundwork for a trans-Afghan rail link to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar. A short southern corridor would cut cargo times to the sea from weeks to days and open new export routes.
The war froze it. Pakistani airstrikes and Taliban counterattacks reopened in late February 2026, the Durand Line crossings have been largely shut since October, and a proposed Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway that would move goods to Pakistani ports in 3 to 5 days rather than 35 sits on hold. A regional analyst called the fighting a setback to every agreement signed on those visits.
While the southern door is shut, Afghanistan turns north. Trade with the five Central Asian states rose 43% in 2025 to $2.7 billion, with Uzbekistan alone at $1.6 billion. Termez, the Uzbek bridge town on the Amu Darya, reopened to individuals in late December. More than 70% of Afghanistan’s imported electricity already comes from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
The rail map shows the stakes. One line links Mazar-e-Sharif to Termez today. The planned Trans-Afghan, or “Kabul Corridor,” would run from Termez toward Kharlachi and is estimated to cost $5 billion to $7 billion. Kazakhstan has committed $500 million to the Turgundi-Herat line from Turkmenistan’s border. Moscow sees the route as a possible extension of its North-South corridor, and China, Iran and Turkey each have an interest in how it develops.
Central Asia’s dream of cheap sea access is hostage to a war it does not control.
The pattern to watch is dependence. A shut Pakistani border makes Afghanistan lean harder on Central Asia for goods and power, which hands Tashkent and Ashgabat leverage over Kabul. It also leaves Central Asia’s own route to the sea hostage to a war it does not control. The corridor everyone is building assumes a peace that does not yet exist.