Viktor Vasilyev, who chairs the CSTO’s Permanent Council, told a St. Petersburg forum this week that Afghanistan is the bloc’s main challenge in Central Asia and that the border stays “complicated.” He said member states would step up joint efforts to neutralise militant and extremist groups gathering near Afghanistan’s northern borders.
The warning rests on real incidents. In late November 2025, two attacks from Afghan territory struck districts in Khatlon and Gorno-Badakhshan. In January, Tajik border guards fought at least two clashes with militants who crossed the 1,300 km frontier. Tajik and Chinese authorities say some attacks targeted Chinese-backed businesses. Taliban officials have expressed regret and deny that foreign fighters operate from Afghan soil.
The bloc’s problem is capacity. The CSTO shipped arms to Tajik border guards in January and now hints at deploying its own personnel. With Russian men and materiel tied down in Ukraine, it is unclear what Moscow can spare for a border far to its south. The guarantee on paper and the force available on the ground are drifting apart.
A stretched Russia keeps the formal role. A cautious China holds the money and the exposure.
China is the quiet variable. It has replaced Russia as Tajikistan’s largest trade partner and holds major stakes in its roads, mines and border infrastructure. Beijing has been content to let the CSTO carry border security while its own assets take the hits. If the raids persist, that patience may run out, and China has shown before that it will place its own security footprint in Tajikistan’s east when it judges the need.
The question underneath is who ends up guaranteeing this border. A stretched Russia keeps the formal role and the base near Dushanbe. A cautious China holds the money and the exposure. The longer the raids continue, the wider the gap between the two, and the harder Tajikistan has to weigh whose security umbrella it actually relies on.