The import bill is the visible number. Behind it is a decade of decline: domestic output fell to 42.2 billion cubic meters in 2024 while consumption climbed to 54.6 bcm, pushed by population and industry. Winter heating and power shortages have become a recurring feature.
The fix so far is Russian gas. Uzbekistan contracted around 7.7 bcm for 2025 through pipelines that once carried Uzbek gas the other way, with talk of volumes rising toward 11 bcm. Falling sales to China at the same time narrow Tashkent's room to bargain on price.
The import line is fiscal and strategic at once. Every extra dollar of purchased gas deepens reliance on Russia's network and on a supplier that has shown it will use energy for pressure.
Every extra dollar of purchased gas deepens reliance on a supplier that treats gas as a political tool.
It also explains the rest of Uzbekistan's energy program. The nuclear build at Jizzakh with Rosatom, the large solar and wind pipeline, and new gas fields promised for 2026 are all attempts to free gas for industry and export rather than burn it for baseload.
Watch two things: whether the new fields slow the production decline this year, and whether the China export contracts are cut further. The gas balance is now an Uzbek vulnerability that Moscow and Beijing both price into every other conversation.