The growth belongs to everything except oil. The economy ministry credits the non-commodity sector, up 5.4%, with manufacturing rising 9%, construction 15.3% and pharmaceuticals 38.5%. The release calls the 4.1% level with the first half, which is the point: three weeks of drone strikes on the export infrastructure have not yet dented the headline number.
The oil figure is blunter than anything the energy ministry has published. Seven months at 53.2 million tonnes puts the year well below 2025, and the bureau’s series does not say which weeks did the damage. What exists for July is unofficial: Reuters, from an industry source, put CPC loading at 1.2 to 1.3 million barrels a day, more than 20% below plan. The consortium’s last statement in its own name is dated 30 July.
Production from the statistics bureau, loading from an unnamed Reuters source, exports from nobody.
The ministry’s Monday statement said July flows were redistributed, to Atyrau–Samara and to China, and published no volumes. The Azerbaijani route carries two numbers that measure ambition rather than delivery: KazMunayGas chief Askhat Khasenov gave BTC a 2026 plan of 1.7 million tonnes on Friday, and the ministry has KazMunayGas and SOCAR agreeing to raise Aktau–Baku–Ceyhan transit gradually to 2.2 million tonnes a year, no date attached. Even the larger target is about twelve days of what the CPC carried in 2025. Khasenov said it himself: the CPC has no alternative by economics or by volumes.
That is the shape of the accounting. Production comes from the statistics bureau, loading from an unnamed Reuters source, exports from nobody, and the officially published set is the thinnest of the three.
What would settle the ledger is named and absent: the July loading total, an official export figure, a loss estimate carrying a ministry’s name rather than a commentator’s. The seven-month print shows the state can close an account in eleven days. July’s oil ledger has had the same eleven days, and stays shut.