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Economy

Central Asia puts its law up for rent

Three states have now built four enclaves where their own law steps aside for England's, on leases running to 2066, 2074, 2076 and the year 2100. The rents are real, the tenants are arriving slowly, and the length of the leases is the most honest document the region has published about itself.

Central Asia puts its law up for rent

There is a sentence in Uzbekistan's newest constitutional law that no drafting tradition in the region has produced before. The regime it creates, says the text on the official register, operates until the year 2100. A state whose own development targets run to 2030 has signed a law with an expiry date 74 years out, in another century, addressed to investors most of whom are not yet born.

The law, signed on August 19, creates Enterprise Uzbekistan, an international center for digital technologies at Tashkent's IT Park. Inside its perimeter, contracts and disputes run on the common law of England and Wales and the principles of equity. Profit tax and VAT on export activity sit at zero; foreign specialists pay 12% income tax or none at all, citizens 7.5%; dividends go untaxed. The governing council is chaired by the president of the republic personally. The stated targets: 1,000 companies, 300,000 jobs and $5 billion in service exports by 2030, from a regime that takes legal effect on January 21, 2027 and is now at the stage of drafting its own registration and licensing rules, with a regulatory sandbox allowing 12 months of supervised testing.

It is the fourth such perimeter in the region, and the boldest. Three of the four went up within the last 14 months. Read together, they make up a quiet regional institution of their own: the rented jurisdiction, a fenced acre of foreign law inside a sovereign legal system, leased to capital for about half a century at a time.


The inventory is short and instructive. Kazakhstan built the prototype: the Astana International Financial Centre opened in 2018 with English common law, English as its official language, its own court and an arbitration centre, and tax exemptions running to 2066. It is the only one of the four with a track record. By this April its governor was reporting $21.5 billion in attracted investment, more than 5,400 registered companies from 88 countries, and over 284 billion tenge in tax receipts to the wider budget, the centre's counterargument to the charge that an enclave hoards its benefits. On Monday its regulator was building a fast track for firms already licensed in recognized jurisdictions, the small daily work of making an imported law feel lived-in.

Kyrgyzstan followed last summer, and went further on paper. The Tamchy special financial-investment territory, created by law No. 136 of July 2025, offers residents a zero tax rate for 49 years and full profit repatriation on 6,000 hectares of Issyk-Kul shoreline. Its permitted trades run from banking, insurance and brokerage to fintech, Islamic finance and gaming, with weapons, alcohol, tobacco and mining kept out; its dispute centre, named the International Dispute Resolution Centre, applies English-law principles, and its rulings cannot be appealed in Kyrgyz courts. The management bodies, the founding coverage noted plainly, are not accountable to state organs, and the governing council is chaired by Ayaz Baetov, who also serves as justice minister. Against the targets, 3,900 companies and 10,000 jobs by 2035, the territory so far consists mostly of one business centre of 3,850 square meters, opened in June.

Uzbekistan then built two at once. The Tashkent International Financial Centre arrived by a constitutional law signed on July 13, and the drafting went deep: Article 15 of the constitution was amended, 7 codes and more than 30 laws adjusted. Inside the perimeter, the centre's own acts rank above any conflicting national legislation short of the constitution itself, and the judicial precedents of England and Wales sit in the hierarchy above ordinary Uzbek law. Qualifying financial income is exempt from profit tax and VAT; residents pay 7% income tax, foreign employees none; customs privileges run to 2076. A four-part structure governs it, from a presidential council down to a Financial Services Management regulator and a Tashkent International Commercial Court armed with penalties up to $10 million. Participants must physically occupy offices in the Tashkent City towers; a lease alone does not qualify. Enterprise Uzbekistan is the financial centre's digital twin, down to the courtroom: the new law creates no bench of its own and routes its participants' disputes to that same commercial court. Its lease runs longest of all: to 2100.


What is actually being rented is worth naming precisely. The tax holidays are the advertised rent, but tax holidays exist in the ordinary special economic zones the region has run for decades. The scarce commodity is adjudication: a promise that when a contract breaks, the ruling will come from a court the investor recognizes, under law the investor's counsel can read, insulated from the domestic bench. Those older zones moved warehouses and assembly lines and moved no law firms, because their disputes still ended on that bench. Scholarship has a name for the trade, law as commodity, and a genealogy that runs from Dubai's DIFC in 2004 through Abu Dhabi and Qatar to Astana. A state that cannot quickly make its whole judiciary trustworthy sells exemptions from it instead, one perimeter at a time.

The seller gets paid in more than registration fees. An enclave is a signal flare to capital that reads the whole country as risk; it is a laboratory where regulation can be tested on a fenced population of firms before anyone dares apply it nationally, and Uzbekistan's sandbox clause says so plainly, offering technologies 12 months of supervised running that the national code does not yet know how to give; and it is a bid in a regional auction that has quietly become competitive. Tashkent's advisers benchmark Astana openly, down to the three years Kazakhstan's model needed to start moving. The four perimeters are courting the same pool of money, and the terms show it: each new lease matches or beats the last one's.

The leases are the data. Dubai promised 50 years of zero taxes in 2004. Astana's exemptions run 48 years from opening. Tamchy took 49. Tashkent's financial centre took 50. On the desk's arithmetic, four of the five sit in a tight band around half a century, which is to say: two generations. That is the time these states expect to need before their own institutions could plausibly do the enclave's job, priced by the states themselves and published in their own statutes. Enterprise Uzbekistan's 74 years is the outlier, half again longer than the cluster, and no official text explains the number.

There is a second reading of the horizons, less flattering to the tenants. A lease is only as strong as the world that enforces it. Dubai's 50-year guarantee lasted 21 years before the OECD's global minimum tax reached into the emirate: from 2025, large multinationals there pay 15% whatever the founding promise said. The clause survived; the arithmetic did not. Central Asia's enclaves are writing their guarantees into constitutional statutes in the same decade in which international tax coordination learned to override such guarantees wholesale.


โ€œThe clause survived; the arithmetic did notโ€

The prototype's own ledger counsels patience about the other three. Astana's $21.5 billion in attracted investment is a real number, but trading volume on the centre's exchange came to about $4 billion across three years, a figure Uzbek commentary now cites as a caution: a strong jurisdiction did not automatically produce a market. Dubai needed two decades to reach the top tier. Tashkent starts from the mirror position, the same commentary argues: it has assets waiting, a $600 million national-fund IPO among them, and a jurisdiction nobody has tested. The financial centre launches fully in 2027 or 2028, by the reckoning of the consultants already advising on it, and has decided against building an exchange of its own, weighing instead whether to let the national bourse operate inside the perimeter.

The enclaves also import risks the brochures skip. Astana's centre spent August on the desk's ledger for a different reason: a fund registered there, Fonte Inceptia Alpha, bought 18% of the Russian developer Samolet for 4.2 billion rubles, about $55 million, in a deal reported by Kommersant and Interfax on August 10, and the beneficial ownership behind the purchase has not been published. The centre's regulator has offered no comment that the wires carry. A jurisdiction that rents out predictability can find itself renting out opacity with the same paperwork, and in a decade of sanctions arbitrage the second product has customers too.

The timing sharpens the point. These perimeters are opening in the middle of a sanctions decade, in which Washington's transshipment report lists four regional states in its table of overland nodes and banks from Bishkek to Astana keep repricing the cost of touching Russian money. An enclave offering English law, low taxes and discretion sits on both sides of that market at once: it is where Western capital can be promised insulation from the neighborhood, and where the neighborhood's capital can be dressed for the West. The report's authors filed the four states under a tier labeled small and opportunistic; the enclaves are where opportunism gets a courtroom. Which customer arrives first will decide what they become.

And there is the trust question, which the region's own press asks more bluntly than the governments do: whether an investor who fears a commercial dispute turning criminal will be reassured by an English-law island whose shoreline is guarded by the same state. The enclave model answers with governance charts. Kyrgyzstan exempts Tamchy's management from state accountability. Uzbekistan puts the head of state in the chairman's seat. Each is meant as a guarantee, and each restates the problem it is solving: the law is credible because a specific ruler stands behind it, which is precisely the condition the investor wanted to escape. Astana, eight years in, offers the only partial rebuttal on record, a court that has operated without scandal, and a market that stayed thin anyway.

None of the four has faced that collision in public yet, and the contradiction has a calendar. Enterprise Uzbekistan's regime takes effect on January 21, 2027. The Tashkent centre's exchange decision is pending; its full launch is put at 2027 to 2028, and its first listings will show whether the assets Uzbek commentary counts as lined up actually route through the new perimeter. Tamchy is filling one building. The real test arrives later, unscheduled: the first ruling by an enclave court against a company the state cares about. On that day the region will find out what it signed, and the tenants will find out what 2100 was worth on paper.

Until then, the leases themselves are the story. Between 2018 and this August, three governments concluded that the fastest route to credible law was to import it, fence it and date the fence in the next century. Capital may come at the advertised scale, or it may not. For everyone outside the fence, the old courts remain the address, on terms no statute promises to hold for 49 years, let alone 74. The admission is already on the register.